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In this paper the interaction between users and the interactive theorem prover HOL
is investigated from a human{computer interaction perspective. First, we outline three
possible views of interaction, and give a brief survey of some current interfaces and how
they may be described in terms of these views. Second, we describe and present the
results of an empirical study of intermediate and expert HOL users. The results are
analysed for evidence in support of the proposed view of proof activity in HOL. We
believe that this approach provides a principled basis for the assessment and design of
interfaces to theorem provers.
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1. Introduction
In the most general terms, mechanised theorem proving is about using computers to
justify the elevation of a conjecture into a theorem by nding a formal proof|or at least
by convincing oneself that such a proof exists. In the algorithmic tradition, this means
employing a computer program to determine automatically the truth of a proposition by
means of a mathematically-justied decision procedure or some more heuristic method.
The main elements here are computation over symbolic data representing propositions
and the automated search for a legitimate proof in some space of possible proofs.
In the more interactive tradition, the user interacts with a computer program in order
to participate in proof discovery and construction. While the main elements still include
computation over symbolic data representing propositions, as in the algorithmic tradition,
the concept of interaction between user and system during the search for legitimate proof
becomes central.
Interactive theorem provers and proof-assistants have been developed for a wide range
of logics, styles of reasoning, and applications; some examples include HOL, Isabelle, LP,
Mural, MERRILL and NuPrl. A commonly-cited diculty with the use of interactive
provers is associated with the key feature of any interactive system, namely the user
interface. A poor interface obstructs the interaction between the user and the system.
As a result, the central and distinctive concept of this approach to theorem proving, the
interactive element, is not fully realised. In response to this, several projects have been
undertaken to develop good, usually graphical, interfaces for specic systems. Many in-
terfaces oer a bewildering variety of options such as menus, windows, mouse, click and
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drag, structure editors and proof trees. While the interface designers have clearly consid-
ered their interfaces carefully, the principles for design are seldom explicitly formulated;
and even when they are, the evidence for those principles is lacking.
As a consequence, the resulting interfaces have met with mixed success and many
interface problems remain unsolved. The user and the designer usually have no other
criteria for evaluation of an interface than anecdotes and experience. More specically,
the interface designers have almost universally failed to draw upon the most relevant
discipline|namely, human{computer interaction|in the analysis of the task structure
and information flows between users and the proof system (Hewitt et al., 1992).
Our long term goal is to rectify this lack of analysis and to produce design principles for
interactive theorem provers based on the results of task-oriented analysis and empirical
investigation of user activity. In this paper we present some preliminary results of our
investigations. We present our thoughts on a framework for information flow and the
results of an empirical study of intermediate and expert users of one particular interactive
theorem prover, the HOL system (Gordon and Melham, 1993).
The HOL system is a theorem prover in the style of the Logic of Computable Fuctions
(LCF) system. HOL is use for constructing (or discovering) proofs in higher order logic.
The LCF approach, devised in the late 1970s by Robin Milner, means that theorems
are represented by the values of an abstract data type in a strongly-typed functional
programming language. In the case of HOL, this is the language ML (Paulson, 1991).
Theorem proving in HOL takes place by executing ML functions that operate on the-
orems. These functions may be primitive inference rules or more complex, user-dened
ML functions. In all cases, however, the LCF approach ensures that functions can be
constructed only so as to perform valid logical inferences.
The HOL system has been chosen for initial experiments because of our own familiarity
with it, the system’s large and active user community, and the fact that the interface
problem has been signalled by the construction of several graphical interfaces for it. But
this does not preclude the consideration of other interactive theorem provers in our future
work.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin in Section 2 with some background
material on LCF-style goal-directed proof and proof trees. In Section 3 we propose a
three level model of interaction and within that model, discuss three styles, or \views", of
interaction between users and proof systems: proof as programming, proof by selection,
and proof as structure editing. In Section 4 we give a brief overview of some current
HOL interfaces, noting the views which are supported by each interface. In Section 5 the
experimental method we use to evaluate user activity in theorem proving is presented;
this is followed by the results of our experiments and an analysis of them. In the nal
section we draw some conclusions and outline our plans for future work.
2. Goal-directed Proof Search
The most primitive notion of formal proof is one in which rules of inference are simply
applied in sequence to axioms and previously proved theorems until the desired theorem
is obtained. Computations that achieve this so-called forward proof process are the ul-
timate basis for all logical deduction in LCF-style theorem provers, including HOL. In
the LCF tradition, one performs forward proof by executing a program that invokes the
appropriate sequence of inference rules. Thus, for example, a decision procedure is just
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an ML program that invokes the appropriate sequence of inference rules to prove any
desired member of a well-dened and general class of conjectures.
Decision procedures operate without the need for user intervention, but forward proofs
may also be performed interactively. The user species to the theorem prover which
inference rule is to be applied at each step, obtaining feedback by observing the theorems
that are generated by the rules. The machine acts as a proof-checker, but gives little
support for proof discovery. This is often not a feasible way of nding a proof, since
the exact sequence of inferences required|or even the rst inference required|is rarely
known in advance.
A more promising and natural approach is to set about discovering a proof by working
backwards from the statement to be proved (called a goal) to previously proved theorems
that imply it. This is the backward proof style, in which the search for a proof is the
activity of exploring possible strategies for achieving a goal. For example, one possible
approach to proving a conjunctive formula P ^ Q is to break this goal down into the
two separate subgoals of proving P and proving Q. Likewise, one may seek to prove an
implication 8x: P [x]  Q[x] by reducing this to the subgoal of proving Q[x] under the
assumption P [x] for arbitrary x.
The HOL system, following LCF, supports this style of proof by means of ML functions
called tactics. These are used to break goals down into increasingly simple subgoals, until
the subgoals obtained follow immediately from theorems already derived. In addition
to breaking a goal down into subgoals, a tactic also constructs a sequence of forward
inference steps which can be used to prove the goal, once the subgoals have themselves
been proved. This is necessary because all theorems must ultimately be obtained by
forward proof.
In addition to tactics, ML allows one to implement functions (called tacticals) that
combine elementary tactics together into more complex ones. This allows the user to
build composite tactics that fully decompose a conjecture into immediately-provable
subgoals, and hence can be executed to generate a complete proof of the conjecture.
In practice, these monolithic, composite tactics are the main products of the theorem
proving activity; the software deliverable for a theorem proving project using HOL largely
consists of les of ML source text that execute composite tactics of this kind, generating
a body of theorems related to the problem domain at hand.
The most primitive interface to HOL is just an ML interpreter oering only the facility
to evaluate the application of tactic functions to goals. In practice, however, interactive
goal-directed proof is supported by means of an interface that operates on a proof state
which records the history of the decomposition of a conjecture into subgoals (including
the behind-the-scenes forward proofs that justify the decompositions) together with the
subgoals remaining to be proved. The most rudimentary interface is still a version of the
ML interpreter, but one in which a suitable proof state has been implemented by an ML
data structure and some associated functions for modifying and inspecting it.
The proof state can be viewed abstractly as a goal decomposition tree. This is often
referred to as a proof tree|it being understood that the steps in the \proof" are goal
decompositions in a backward proof attempt. A proof tree represents successive stages
in the decomposition into subgoals of a conjecture to be proved. The root is the original
conjecture, and the leaves are the subgoals remaining to be proved. A goal-directed proof
attempt is successful when all the leaves are immediately provable. The theorem prover
provides a means for dismissing such trivial subgoals.
A simple example of a proof tree is shown in Figure 1. The initial goal is a conjunction.
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‘ (9x: P [x]) ^ (8y: P [y]  Q[y])

HHHHH
‘ 9x: P [x] ‘ 8y: P [y]  Q[y]
‘ P [w] P [y] ‘ Q[y]
Figure 1. A simple proof tree.
In the rst decomposition, this is split into two subgoals consisting of the two conjuncts.
The existential subgoal 9x: P [x] is then reduced to the subgoal of proving P [w] for some
witness value w. The other subgoal 8y: P [y]  Q[y] is reduced to the subgoal of proving
that Q[y] follows from the assumption P [y] for arbitrary y.
The notion of a proof state|the current state of a goal-directed backward proof
attempt|lies at the core of interface support for goal-directed proof. The proof state
is not a primitive HOL concept; the means by which proof states are interactively cre-
ated, modied, and inspected are supplied by the implementation of an interface. Support
for goal-directed proof in HOL is provided by the subgoal package, a collection of ML
functions that operate on a data structure representing the proof state.
To complete a goal-directed proof, it is ultimately necessary to prove all the subgoals
that arise. It is generally the case that subgoals are independent of each other and as a
result the order in which subgoals are proven is not signicant. This suggests that there
is no real benet to be gained by switching attention from branch to branch of the search
tree. The search tree can simply be explored in a xed depth-rst order. Furthermore,
it is not necessary to consider the proof as a whole; only the current subgoal need be
considered. The current proof context can be indicated by a record of the proof steps
applied so far. A record of past subgoal states is not necessarily the best indication of
proof context. The overall shape of the proof is important, and a review of the progress
of the proof may take it into consideration.
3. Describing Proof Behaviour
A number of theories and assumptions about user-proof system interaction underlie
the design of existing interfaces. In many instances these ideas are not articulated explic-
itly. In descriptions of interface designs, the designer’s views of the interaction are not
always easily distinguished from other issues, such as system architecture, or from rep-
resentational issues peculiar to a particular logical framework. In this section we aim to
formulate precisely and explicitly certain views of user-proof system interaction which are
relevant to the construction of eective user interfaces for interactive theorem-provers.
Cooperative, interactive theorem proving, like most human{computer (inter)activity,
can be described at several dierent levels of abstraction. The very same user action, at
a certain point in the proof, can be described as:
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 Choosing a tactic for application.
 Selecting an item from a list.
 Clicking the mouse button with the cursor at a particular location on the display.
All are \correct" and complete descriptions of the same action, but each is framed in
terms of a dierent model (set of objects and applicable operations) of the activity.
These descriptions of the activity are related to one another in at least two important
ways. First, the relationships can form an explanation of user activity. That is, each level
except the top levely can be viewed as an explanation of the level below it. Thus, the
user clicks the mouse at a certain point in order to choose an item from a list, and s/he
selects the item in order to choose a tactic for application. Second, from a design point
of view, a designer must choose a representation (or choose not to oer a representation)
in a lower level for the objects and operations in the next most abstract level. Thus, if
selecting a tactic for application is a desired user action to support, then selecting an
item from a list is one of the possible ways to eect this, and similarly, clicking the mouse
button at a certain point is a way to eect the menu selection.
Such a multi-level view of interaction has been used as the basis for previous expla-
nations of human{computer interaction, albeit never applied specically to the domain
of interactive theorem proving. Nielsen (1986) presents a linguistic account of interac-
tion by asserting that the levels correspond to the lexical, syntactic and semantic levels
of linguistic activity. Norman (1988) asserts that translations from one level to another
form the basis for important potential interaction problems (the so-called gulfs of execu-
tion and evaluation) which arise when a user is not able to perform the transformation
from one level to another. This characterisation of interaction forms the basis for an
explanation of the potential advantages of direct manipulation (Hutchins et al., 1986)
(viz., it reduces the complexity of the inter-level mappings) and metaphorical represen-
tations (viz., mappings can be inferred based on a similarity relation to a separate known
representation).
How many levels of abstraction are necessary to characterise an interaction? This will
depend upon the purpose and nature of the explanation or design rationals which the
characterisation is used to support (Pylyshn, 1986). We have found that for a design-
oriented description of user interfaces to theorem provers it is sucient to use three
levels:
a logical level. This is a description solely in terms of logical concepts.
an abstract interaction level. At this level are the shared objects
and operations in terms of which information is communicated from
user to system. Typically, these are visual(isable) objects and the op-
erations upon them, but abstracted away from details of their physical
form. Examples include diagrams, structured text, visualised lists.
a concrete interaction level. At this level are actions on input de-
vices and the perceptual characteristics of display objects.
Each level of abstraction is self-contained, in the sense that a full description of the
y The top level description forms the motivational basis of the activity. That is, goals at this level are
not open to further explanation. To move beyond this level is to look for the motivation of the user to
engage in the activity.
268 J. S. Aitken et al.
activity can be framed within a level. One can instruct a user to carry out a full proof
entirely in terms of articulations of devices. Or, assuming that the user knows, can
guess, or learn the representation, the user can be instructed in terms of the higher level
abstractions.
But a full description, even at a given level, must include operations which extend
beyond those in which there is a flow of information between the parties to the interaction.
That is, there are operations which belong solely to one party or the other and are needed
to form a complete picture of the activity. In our example, the user must have determined
that the tactic to be chosen is the appropriate one at the current state of the proof. This
determination may be an entirely private, cognitive activity. Similarly, once the tactic
has been specied to the computer system, its application is an internal computer action
requiring no intervention on the part of the user.
There is a class of user cognitive activity which, although not strictly part of the
user{system interaction as described so far, is an important part of our analysis. User
goals and plans determine the form of the interaction and the outcomes of interaction
fed back into subsequent plan formulation. We take no theoretical stance on the form
of such cognitive activity or the mental representation of cognitive structures (mental
models), but we are concerned to discover user plans and beliefs which influence and are
influenced by the interaction.
It is our contention that developments in user interface design for interactive theorem
provers have been driven largely by considerations at the level of the concrete interaction
domain and its relationship to the abstract interaction domain. These are often called
styles or techniques of interaction and include such components as particular visual rep-
resentations of tree structures, drag-and-drop interaction techniques, pop-up menus, and
so on.
Relatively unexamined is the relationship between the abstract interaction domain and
the logical domain. Our work to date has focused on this relationship. In the same way
that representation choices at the lower level are grouped as styles, one can categorise
the ways that the top level, logical, domain is related to its representation in the abstract
interaction domain. We call these categories views. Views determine what in the logical
domain will be represented, how it will be represented (at least in part), and place
constraints on the nature of the relationship.
It should be emphasised that neither the notion of views, nor our multi-level account
of proof construction activity, imply that the user is aware of the mediating relationship.
A user might think of the proof activity, and develop action plans, entirely in terms of
a description in the logical and/or abstract interaction domain. We follow Nardi and
Zarmer (1993) in believing that the abstract interaction domain|the shared represen-
tation of user and system|forms a structure or framework in terms of which to solve
problems in the logical domain. Views provide the organising principles by which such a
framework can be generated. The view determines:
1. the aspects of the logical domain which should be made salient to the user;
2. the relevant operations in the logical domain which should be performed in the
abstract interaction domain;
3. constraints on action and properties of the logical domain which either need not or
should not be represented.
In examining current user interfaces to theorem provers, we have identied three such
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views, although others are possible. They are proof as programming, proof by pointing,
and proof as structure editing. We now turn to an examination of these views.
3.1. proof as programming
The proof as programming view stems from two fundamental elements of the LCF
approach to theorem proving: the system’s command language is a strongly-typed pro-
gramming language, and an abstract data type of formal theorems in this language is used
to distinguish formulas that have been proved from arbitrary propositions. The merit of
this scheme is that the type discipline ensures security; theorems can be generated only
by using the functions that implement primitive inference rules and programs that call
them. A consequence is that, whatever code a user may write intending to implement a
particular proof strategy, the system can never perform an invalid logical inference.
In LCF-style systems, backward proof is implemented using tactics|higher order func-
tions that map goals into subgoals together with proof procedures that justify this de-
composition. Historically, backward proof using tactics is the chief method of proof in
LCF-style systems; indeed, for many users it is virtually the only method of proof. But
tactics are not the only way of generating theorems; with the security of the LCF ap-
proach comes the freedom to write arbitrary code intended to compute a desired theorem.
One could, for example, code a decision procedure that operates purely by forward proof
(e.g. by equational rewriting, or rst-order resolution) and can be invoked to generate
any element of a whole class of theorems. In this case, the user is clearly engaged in an
activity having the nature of programming|writing programs that compute theorems.
The view that proof is programming also regards tactic proofs as programs to compute
theorems. The user develops tactic proofs piecemeal, by applying individual tactics that
break down the goal into ever simpler subgoals. But once the proof has been found,
the tactics are composed into a monolithic and complete proof strategy|a functional
program that can be executed to prove the desired theorem from scratch. The nal
product of the activity is a program; and thus goal-directed theorem proving using tactics
is a specialised kind of programming activity.
Thus, proof as programming recasts the proof problems, as dened in the logical do-
main, as programming problems. Figure 2 sketches the levels of abstraction making up
the proof as programming view. As can be seen, construction and execution of program
texts is a fundamental organising concept of this view. Tactics and the functions that
combine them are the medium through which the user interactively explores possibilities
and constructs a proof. But they also constitute program texts, which are executed to
extend the proof state and are kept as a permanent record of the proof.
It does not follow from the above that users think of proof construction as program-
ming. Rather, one would expect that, given a successful user interface, users would be
relatively unaware of writing and executing parts of a program. This is an important
point. Progamming is not a metaphor for proof construction; instead, programming is
the medium through which proofs are constructed and expressed. One would expect that
a descent from thinking at the logical level to planning and evaluating at the abstract
interaction level would occur if there is a breakdown in the interaction (i.e., some re-
quired information is not available or an operation not known). An advantage of proof
as programming is the fact that when breakdown occurs because of the lack of a rep-
resentation in the abstract interaction domain (e.g. there is no tactic which represents
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Concrete Interaction Level:
sequences of keypresses
modications to edited text
displayed data
Abstract Interaction Level:
editing tactic texts (ML code)
executing tactics (function application)
the proof state
Logical Level:
backward proof and goal decomposition
logically legitimate proof-steps
conjectures to be proved (goals)
‘ P ^ Q
‘ P ‘ Q

HHH
P ^ Q| {z }
P Q
z }| {?
"P /\ Q"
"P"
"Q"
Figure 2. Proof as programming.
some desired goal decomposition), one can \bridge the representational gap" without
switching abstract interaction domains.
It is not, of course, clear that the idea of programming is to be extended to the
goal-directed process of proof discovery itself. Nonetheless, the analogy is one possible
explanation of the activity that relates the user’s notion of the proof strategy and the
abstract interaction domain concepts of proof states and tactics. Hence this view has
implications for interface evaluation and design|how well does proof as programming
explain what really goes on, and does designing an interface consonant with this view
increase productivity?
3.2. proof by pointing
Proof by pointing (or, perhaps more accurately, proof by selection) has been proposed
by Bertot et al. (1994) as a means of synthesising commands to the theorem prover
by selecting a subexpression of the current goal (typically, using a mouse). It has been
shown that in the Sequent Calculus, an appropriate sequence of rules drawn from the
rules for elimination and introduction of logical connectives can be selected by identifying
a particular subexpression on the left- or right-hand side of the turnstile symbol ‘. For
example, pointing at \P (a)" in the disjunctive hypothesis of the goal P (a) _ Q(a) ‘ R
is interpreted as a desire to do a case analysis, and consequently two new subgoals are
introduced, one for each of the two disjuncts. Selecting a subterm not governed by the
outermost connective is interpreted as a desire to bring that term to the outside. In
doing so, the prover may apply several inference rules and may be able to solve any
simple subgoals that arise.
In tactic-based provers, proof by pointing is intended to free the user from having to
edit commands during goal-directed proofs (Bertot, 1994). The user may then concentrate
directly on the goals and theorems of the proof. The proof by pointing tool in the Coq
theorem prover deals with the logical connectives ^;_;;:;8 and 9. If a subexpression
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of a premise is selected and the premise is existentially quantied, then a command
which produces a witness for this formula will be generated. If the premise is universally
quantied then a command which generates an instance of the formula will be produced.
In a similar fashion, commands that break up conjunctions and introduce case splits will
be generated according to a convention.
For simple logics, proof by pointing provides a complete proof technique that can be
executed by purely mouse-based input operations. For the logics of most tactic-based
provers, however, pointing can replace only some typed commands. Certain sequences
of tactics can be synthesised from pointing actions, but for others some dierent kind
of input may be required|perhaps a selection from a list of several possible actions, or
even some text. This is because there may be no clear one-to-one correspondence between
logical-level manoeuvers and the expressions at which one may possibly point.
The proof by pointing idea can, however, be extended by connecting the application of
a tactic with the pointing action. This yields the so-called \point and shoot" technique.
Suppose that Elim is the induction proof command. Then the actions \point" and ‘select
Elim" introduce an induction scheme that would validate the propositional expression
pointed to.
In proof by pointing, the logical level appears to be identical to that in proof as
programming. But at the abstract interaction level, there are no program texts and no
program execution. There is only a proof state, which is transformed by acts of selection|
choosing an operation to perform on the current goal.
3.3. proof as structure editing
Some logical formalisms include an object-language notion of proof. For example, in
type theory (Martin-Lo¨f, 1984) one has the \propositions-as-types" reading, in which one
views a type A as a proposition and a well-typed term a :: A as a proof of A. Here, the
logical term a is a formal proof object|a syntactic object, with an underlying syntactic
structure related to the structure of the proposition A. This makes possible the view
that proof construction and exploration consist in editing proof objects using a structure
editor.
One theorem proving system that exemplies the proof as structure editing view is
the ALF proof editor (Magnusson and Nordstro¨m, 1994). In ALF, the process of prov-
ing a conjecture A consists in building a proof object for A. The proof state has two
components: the goal A, together with an incomplete proof object that represents the
current state in the process of proving A. The intent is that a proof object is built up by
direct manipulation|i.e. some form of structure editing. An incomplete proof object is
a structure with one or more placeholders indicating positions in the structure for those
parts of the object yet to be created. A typical editing operation extends an incomplete
proof object by lling in a placeholder with a proof object, perhaps itself incomplete.
Proof as structure editing can also take place when the notion of proof is meta-
linguistic, where proofs are not objects in the term language of the logic. For example,
the Mural system (Jones et al., 1991) supports essentially the same \natural deduction"
style of proof as HOL, but using a structure editing interface for proof construction and
display. This is in keeping with one of the general principles adopted by the designers of
Mural, namely to allow \direct manipulation" of objects wherever possible. This leads to
extensive use of structure editors, not just for proof construction, but for the construction
and editing of many other objects as well.
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In proof as structure editing, the abstract interaction level is organised around a proof
state which includes proof objects. The proof proceeds by structure editing of these proof
objects. We suspect that this view leads to a dierent perspective at the logical level,
but we have not yet investigated the issue in depth.
4. Some Interfaces to HOL
In this section we describe three interfaces to HOL, with reference to the views de-
scribed above. All three adopt the proof as programming view to a greater or lesser
extent. Two are X-windows based interfaces, XHOL and CHOL, and extend the basic
emacs interface to HOL by providing a proof tree display and a simple structure editing
facility respectively.
We begin by describing a proposal to extend support for proof as programming without
necessarily modifying the visual presentation of HOL.
4.1. extending support for proof as programming
Slind and Prehofer (1994) advocate that users of verication systems be given support
in three areas: formalisation, proof and interface. These cover the entire range of veri-
cation activities, from the formalisation in logic of the domain of interest, through to
the proof procedure and storing the product of the proof attempt. They do not aim to
provide a distinct new interface, but to extend the ML environment in useful ways. Such
extensions would provide the user with a more supportive programming environment,
and hence this work can be classied under the proof as programming heading.
When discussing the interface, Slind and Prehofer note the problems of the presenta-
tion of long and complex expressions. Their recommendations for interface design include
modifying certain technical aspects of the ML interface to HOL, for example the overload-
ing of constants. They also discuss the use of prettyprinting facilities and the possibility
of using full scale document preparation systems for the presentation of expressions. They
endorse the argument that the visualisation of theories (and their relationships) increases
modularity, which must aid the development of large proofs.
Slind (1994) describes a proof manager whose role is to handle the complexities of a
large proof attempt which involves a collection of proofs. This is to be achieved by intro-
ducing notes, a form of documentation originally due to Kalvala (1991, 1994), into the
ML data structures. The basic approach to discovering a proof using the proof manager
is depth-rst search, although forward proof is also permitted. While a proof attempt is
being made, the user makes textual notes that comment the proof, perhaps describing
the reasons for particular decisions. In developing a collection of proofs, the user makes
notes on entire proof attempts.
The interface should be capable of presenting information in multiple forms, appropri-
ate to the context. The interface should, presumably, support the informal documentation
of proofs and maintain the appropriate links between notes.
4.2. XHOL: an interface with a proof tree display
The XHOL interface to HOL has been developed by Schubert and Biggs (1994). This
provides a four-panelled display, including a window where a standard HOL session runs,
an emacs-style window which displays the proof script, and a window displaying a proof
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tree. The user can type tactics into the editor window or select tactics from a menu and
these appear in the editor window. The highlighted region of the proof script can be sent
to the HOL session by clicking on a \send" button. This replaces the typical cut and
paste method of transferring the tactic text from the editor to HOL. XHOL provides a
means of automatically constructing a new tactic as the concatenation of a sequence of
tactics. The operation is termed \tactic extraction". Once extracted, a tactic sequence
can easily be re-applied to a new problem. This facility aids the user at the abstract
interaction level, and is clearly within the proof as programming view. This interface
modies many features at the concrete interaction level, while remaining similar to the
emacs interface at the surface level.
XHOL displays the subgoal structure of the current proof as a tree. A tree is a nat-
ural representation of the decomposition of a goal into subgoals. In backwards proof, a
proof tree shows what has been proven and what subgoals remain to be proven. It has
been claimed (Schubert and Biggs, 1994) that such a display provides clues about the
techniques and tactics that may be useful in completing the proof attempt.
Schubert and Biggs are concerned with the needs of large proof development and with
speeding up the user-proof system interaction. In order to cope with the former, their
HOL interface provides a means to view only part of the proof tree (which may become
very large) and to control how much information is displayed at each node of the tree.
Speeding up the interaction is addressed by providing a menu of tactics which the user
may select from, with a view to saving the time required to type complex commands.
The rationale for the proof tree presentation appears to be that it is useful, during the
proof attempt, to view the proof as a whole. It must also be assumed that a display of
goal states is the most appropriate way to display the proof. Evidence for the usefulness
of examining the proof as a whole has not been presented. In addition, no justication
has been given for the decision to present the goal states and not to present the tactics
which transform one state into another, or to label the branches of the proof tree in some
appropriate way, e.g. with the case argument (P and :P in a case split) or with the
name of a witness in an existence proof.
The idea of presenting the proof attempt as a tree is intuitively appealing, but requires
scrutiny. There are practical problems in the use of proof trees as in long proofs many
nodes are generated and their contents may be large expressions. This appears to work
against the aim of providing support for large scale proof development.
4.3. CHOL: a Centaur interface to HOL
CHOL (Thery, 1994) is also an X interface to HOL. The proof script window of the
standard interface is retained, but its functionality is altered so that tactics may be en-
tered by editing or by menu selection and placeholders may be left in the tactic script.
For example, after introducing INDUCT_TAC (which would usually be followed by two argu-
ments) it is possible to leave the rst argument blank, and to ll in the second argument.
This is equivalent to solving the step case of the induction rst, and then proceeding to
solve the base case. The view here is no longer proof as programming, where the same
eect could be achieved by rotating the subgoals (i.e. using an ML command to swap the
subgoal order). A structure editing view is required to explain this style of interaction.
CHOL does not present the user with a window to the HOL session; instead, the current
goal is displayed in a \goal window". If the proof appears to require a rewriting step,
CHOL has the capability to calculate all possible rewrites of a selected expression and
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to present these as a menu to the user (Thery et al., 1992). The user can then select the
required rewrite and CHOL will update the goal state. The user can select the theories
which are used to calculate the possible rewrites, and hence, exercise control over this
process. The user is given visual feedback as to the tactic which eected the particular
rewrite s/he selected, as the tactic, including the theorem name, appears in the script.
This treatment of the rewrite operation has much in common with the proof by pointing
view. However, as the user is also informed about which tactic was used, the proof as
programming view is maintained.y
At the concrete interaction level, there is little similarity to the standard HOL interface,
hence a learning overhead for all users is inevitable. CHOL also provides assistance to
the user in searching the contents of the theory libraries for theorems and denitions.
This activity can be very time consuming for new users and also for those unfamiliar
with a particular library.
4.4. Changing Views
We see from the discussion above that the CHOL interface does not exclusively adhere
to the proof as programming view. This raises the interesting question as to whether
users can easily move from the dominant view, which we believe for HOL is proof as
programming, to one or both of the other views utilised in CHOL.
However, prior to being able to investigate whether users can make use of dierent
views of their activity, we should validate the proposed view of proof as programming. In
the following section, we present an empirical investigation into the use of the standard
HOL interface.
5. An Empirical Investigation of Interactive Proof in HOL
This investigation aims to discover the degree to which proof as programming matches
what users actually do in practice. The prover under consideration is the HOL prover
and the organising view of the standard interface to this prover is proof as programming.
We are certain of our model of the prover’s behaviour and our objective is validate our
model of its use.
In common with Polson (1987) we do not try to model fundamental cognitive processes
such as retrieval of knowledge from long term memory. Rather, we are testing our claims
regarding the logical and abstract interaction levels of the proposed view. In this study,
we are not interested in evaluating the interaction model at the concrete interaction
level; this would only conrm properties of the chosen editor at the keystroke level,
which we do not believe to be critical in the proof as programming view. In other views,
the evaluation would necessarily consider the concrete interaction level. For example, in
proof by pointing the point and click action is central to the user{system interaction.
In the following sections we describe the behaviour we expect to observe, indicate how
common we expect it to be and state how we shall quantify it. We then present the
results of an experimental trial and our assessment of the proposed view of interaction.
We also examine features of the user{HOL interaction about which we can make no
predictions, but which are important to interface design. These include the granularity
y The automatic insertion of the tactic in the script could also be consistent with the structure editing
view: the insertion being automatic instead of manual.
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Successful, Partially
Successful or Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Figure 3. A partially completed questionnaire.
at which users enter commands and the errors made when eliminating logical connectives
from formulae. The latter is a task which might be aided by a graphical interface.
Experimental data on the granularity of user input are relevant to interface design as
designers often modify the way in which users are able to input commands. Interface
designers must make decisions as to what information will be displayed and by what
means. Experimental evidence about the visual cues that users commonly utilise can be
used to rank the importance of the many sources of information that might be displayed
by a graphical interface. Therefore, the investigation we describe is not restricted to
testing the proof as programming view, it also aims to provide valuable information
about how users perform proof using the current HOL interface. This information can be
used to inform interface design and can serve as a reference against which new designs
can be evaluated.
5.1. experimental method
Subjects were asked to prove a theorem using HOL88 or HOL90, the two most widely
used HOL implementations. They were asked to start up a HOL session in an emacs
window and to set up an editor window for the ML le in the manner in which they
would usually do so. The interface then consisted of two windows and the activities in
both windows were recorded. Subjects were given the theorem to be proved and asked
to think-aloud while performing the proof but not to give detailed explanations. Their
speech was recorded on audio tape.
After the proof was completed subjects were asked to explain the central ideas of
the proof and to complete a questionnaire. For each proof step, i.e. for each sequence
of tactics input to HOL, the subject was asked the questions listed in Figure 3.y The
subject was also asked to group proof steps together to indicate the strategic thinking
behind the phases of the proof attempt.
The experimental method records all proof steps entered into HOL and the results
of their application. Hence the sequence of user inputs can be assessed at the abstract
interaction level. The subjective importance of visual cues is documented. This provides
valuable evidence about the visual cues which users make use of during the proof attempt.
Evidence about the structure of the proof at the logical level can also be inferred from
y In fact, the questionnaire also asked other questions, but these are of no relevance here.
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the post-proof questionnaire. A detailed analysis of the think-aloud protocols yields more
knowledge of the logical level thinking of the subjects and its relation to the abstract
interaction level, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. We can make predictions
about the way in which proofs are developed and about the relative importance of visual
cues from the proof as programming view, as we shall now show.
5.1.1. backwards proof
We predict that proofs will be developed in a backwards manner. As described above,
this means of developing a proof is supported by the HOL subgoal package and is an es-
sential feature of the abstract interaction level. We also expect users to explore unfruitful
parts of the search space and to use the backup command to return them to an earlier
proof state. In order to judge the extent to which this happens, we decided to quantify
the number of backing up steps and the size of the proof space explored. Proofs may also
be developed in a forwards manner and we might expect users to perform short proofs
of lemmas in this way.
We hypothesise that proof steps are selected on local context information and the
experimental trial was designed to test this hypothesis. The local context is dened
by the current goal and the current assumptions and is a component of the abstract
interaction level as illustrated in Figure 2. It is certainly the case that task structure
(Norman, 1988), or logical, considerations also play a very important role in decision
making. However, there is no means other than protocol analysis to assess the influence
of the subject’s current logical strategy on tactic choice and we shall not investigate this
question here.
It is possible that the user may modify the proof script at a place other than the end of
the script. The proof script is an object at the abstract interaction level and the activity
of editing the script is consistent with the proof as programming view. However, this
activity does require the user to understand the proof script as a program. As stated
above, we do not expect users to view their activity as programming and so we do not
expect the renement of the proof script to be common. The frequency of this behaviour
was measured by counting the number of times a tactic is inserted into the proof script
(at a position other than the end of the current script). A second measure of this activity
is to count the number of times that expressions occurring in commands are repeated.
If we observe that a subject repeatedly modies a command and replays it, we can
conclude that command renement is taking place. If the subject follows the backwards
proof model, then it is unlikely that an expression used in a previous tactic would occur
again. Hence, we do not expect command renement to be common.
5.1.2. command granularity and the usefulness of visual cues
It was observed in an earlier study of HOL users that one interaction, that is one proof
step, may combine several tactics. The granularity at which users might enter tactics is
not restricted by the standard interface. We determined the granularity at which users
actually do enter tactics from the trace of the proof session.
Users base their choice of tactic on many sources of information; the possibilities include
the current goal, the current assumptions and past subgoal states. Past subgoal states are
sometimes displayed in the proof tree presentation and evidence that users examine these
states would support the use of proof trees as an appropriate display for HOL proofs.
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The relative importance of these information sources was assessed by the questionnaire
of Figure 3. The questionnaire asks for the subject’s opinion on whether a particular
cue was used and is intended to collect subjective evidence for the use of a cue. These
questions are not intended to document whether or not a particular tactic modies the
goals or modies the assumptions in a purely logical sense. However, a strong correlation
between these is to be expected.
5.1.3. investigating the logical level
It is known that several tactics are often required to perform a particular operation
at the logical level. For example, the tactic for a key proof idea (e.g. induction) may be
preceded by several tactics that put the goal into the correct form rst. Likewise, some
tidying up steps may be needed afterwards.
The number of tactic groups, or contexts, in a proof attempt therefore reflects the
logical level structure of the proof better than the number of proof steps or the number
of individual tactics. To further investigate the relation between tactics, proof steps, and
contexts, we decided to ask subjects to group proof steps into sequences of related steps.
5.1.4. the utility of a pointing mechanism for HOL
Selecting a particular subexpression, e.g. with the mouse is one potential application
of proof by pointing in HOL. This arises in the elimination of quantiers and truth
functional connectives from the goal and from assumptions. In the command line inter-
face to HOL, the user must expand tactics which successively eliminate connectives to
the desired depth. This may result in errors such as eliminating too many quantiers
by a choosing a tactic such as REPEAT STRIP_TAC, which repeatedly removes connectives,
and subsequently having to back up and apply STRIP_TAC until the desired connective is
reached. We analysed the traces of the proof sessions for this type of error. The observa-
tion of such errors alone does not provide evidence for proof by pointing as a framework
for interaction with HOL. However, if the error rate for this task is high, this would
indicate the utility of a selection tool in a HOL interface.
5.2. results
All subjects were asked to prove the following induction theorem:
‘ 8P:(P [ ] ^ (8x:P [x] ^ 8l1 l2:(Pl1 ^ Pl2)  P (APPENDl1l2))  8l:P l:
This states that if P holds of the empty list and all singleton lists, and if P holds
for the append of any two lists for which P holds, then P holds of all lists. Figure 4
shows the tactic proof of this theorem discovered by subject 1. This gure illustrates
the relationship between proof steps, tactics and contexts. The rst two of the six proof
steps contain multiple tactics (connected by THEN). The four contexts of the proof are
indicated by boxes. The rst context, A, contains one proof step, made up of four tactics.
This context includes the preparation for list induction, the induction step itself and the
solution of the base case. Other subjects discovered this part of the proof in several proof
steps. They also indicated more contexts; for example, the solution of the base case was
often distinguished from the earlier steps.
Each subject estimated their total experience, in months, with the HOL system and
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1# GEN_TAC THEN STRIP_TAC THEN LIST_INDUCT_TAC 
           THEN ASM_REWRITE_TAC[];;
2# GEN_TAC THEN FIRST_ASSUM(UNDISCH_TAC o 
                           assert is_forall o concl);;
3# DISCH_THEN(MP_TAC o SPEC "h*:");;
4# DISCH_THEN(CONJUNCTS_THEN2 ASSUME_TAC MP_TAC);;
5# DISCH_THEN(MP_TAC o SPECL ["[h:*]"; "l:(*)list"]);;
6# ASM_REWRITE_TAC[APPEND];; 
A
B
C
D
Figure 4. An example of a tactic proof.
Table 1. Basic parameters.
Subject HOL Current Number of Proof Steps Time
Experience HOL Usage Interactions (min s−1)
(months) Explored In proof
1 54 VF 13 6 6 7.36
2 12 VF 37 14 7 10.44
3 7 VF 50 16 10 19.25
4 120 F 30 12 10 10.32
5 108 F 38 13 6 33.15
6 96 F 40 14 9 30.32
7 24 NIL 72 20 8 61.25
quantied their current usage. Current usage was estimated over the past six months and
categorised as very frequent (VF), frequent (F), occasional (O) or nil (NIL). The tables of
results are ordered according to current usage and total HOL experience. Consequently,
subject 1 is a very frequent user with the greatest total experience with HOL and subject
7 is the least frequent user. The data are presented in Table 1. It should be noted that
subject 7 did not complete the proof and hence the gure of 8 in the \In Proof" column
means that 8 proof steps remained in the proof script at the end of the trial. It is also
notable that three proof steps executed by subject 4 were carried out as forwards proof.
The total number of interactions with the HOL system, the number of proof steps
explored and the number of proof steps in nal proof are also given in Table 1. These
gures show the eciency of the interactive proof, both in terms of the steps explored
which were unsuccessful, and the number of interactions required for each proof step.
The time taken for each proof attempt is also listed in Table 1.
The traces of the interaction with HOL were analysed to yield the data in Table 2. The
data was obtained from an assessment of the entire proof attempt. The number of times
the backup command was used is indicated in column 2 of Table 2. This table also shows
the numbers of steps inserted into a proof script. The number of repeated expressions
is the number of proof steps which occur multiple times. These gures indicate whether
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a subject has backed up and edited the proof script (as opposed to backing up and
exploring an alternative proof) and how many expressions were repeatedly entered into
HOL.
Table 2 also shows the number of errors in decomposing the goal, i.e. in eliminating
logical connectives and in instantiating universally quantied variables. Whether a de-
composition step was judged to be unsuccessful was determined by the subject’s response
to the questionnaire.
Table 3 contrasts the number of proof steps (the number of lines of inputs to HOL)
with the number of tactics and the number of contexts. A proof step may be composed
of several tactics and a number of proof steps may be grouped together as performing a
specic task. The number of proof steps and tactics were read from the log of the proof
session, while the grouping of tactics was obtained from the questionnaire. Each column
of Table 3 lists the number of proof steps (tactics and contexts respectively) in the nal
proof and also lists the number of proof steps explored during the entire proof attempt.
The latter is the gure in brackets.
Table 4 shows the frequency with which subjects stated that their cues for selecting a
proof step included the current goal, the current assumptions or a past subgoal. These
data are simply those obtained from the questionnaire and refer to the entire proof
attempt. The gures for the percentage of proof steps where the current assumptions
were stated to be a cue are expressed as a percentage of all proof steps where there were
assumptions, as opposed to a percentage of all explored proof steps.
5.3. analysis
There was a large variation in the time taken to prove the goal, from 7 min 36 s to
over 33 min|a factor of 4.4. There is no simple relationship between the time taken to
nd the proof and the number of interactions or the number of proof steps explored.
More frequent users can interact with the theorem prover more rapidly, both in terms
of recalling and entering tactics and theorems and interpreting the results. This implies
that more frequent users do not, in general, try to minimise the number of interactions
with the prover but use the prover as a means to formally check their conjectures. This
conclusion is supported by the results of Table 1 which shows that subjects 2 and 3
explored more proof steps than subjects 4, 5 and 6 and interacted more with the HOL
prover, but took less time to solve the problem (on average).
Less frequent users used the HOL prover less fluently. They did not explore proof steps
in proportion to the time they took to nd the proof. Instead, they spent time discov-
Table 2. Data on backing up and renement.
Subject Backing- Inserted Repeated Decomposition
up steps proof steps expressions errors
1 0/6 0 0 0/4
2 5/14 1 5 1/10
3 2/16 1 2 1/8
4 0/12 0 1 0/4
5 0/13 1 2 0/5
6 2/14 0 1 1/6
7 2/20 0 1 0/3
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Table 3. Data on proof steps, tactics and contexts.
Subject Proof steps Tactics Contexts
1 6 (6) 10 (10) 4 (4)
2 7 (14) 8 (18) 3 (5)
3 10 (16) 13 (19) 6 (6)
4 10 (12) 9 (10) 3 (3)
5 6 (13) 10 (19) 3 (7)
6 9 (14) 9 (14) 3 (7)
7 8 (20) 10 (24) 3 (7)
Table 4. Data on cues.
Subject Current Current Past
goal (%) assumptions (%) subgoals (%)
1 83 40 0
2 71 82 0
3 88 82 0
4 92 90 0
5 85 64 8
6 36 50 50
7 100 69 23
Average 79 68 12
ering how to construct syntactically correct tactics and discovering whether a particular
theorem was loaded into the system or whether it existed at all.
5.3.1. evidence for backwards proof
All proof attempts were developed backwards from the goal. Three of the seven proof
attempts contain no backing up steps (Table 2). This means that the subject simply
applied proof step after proof step. Three subjects backed up twice. Two of these proof
attempts (subjects 6 and 7) did not include an inserted proof step which indicates that
backing up was done to explore a new proof. Consequently, in ve out of the seven
proof attempts studied the activity can best be described as backwards proof. It should
be noted that subject 4 actually performed a short forwards proof in the midst of the
backwards proof.
In the case of subject 3, backing up was connected with inserting a new proof step.
This indicates that the proof script was rened once. In the case of subject 2, the proof
script was rened once and the number of backing up steps was more than twice that
of any other subject. The number of repeated expressions was also more than twice that
of any other subject and this indicates that commands were also being rened during
this proof attempt. In common with all other subjects, subject 2 developed a backwards
proof; but the manner in which this was done was signicantly dierent.
The current goal was stated to be a cue for 79% of proof step selections, averaged over
the seven trials (Table 4). The current assumptions were stated to be cues for 68% of
proof step selections, while past subgoals were stated to be cues on an average of 12%
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of proof step selections (averaged over the seven trials).y These results indicate that for
the majority of subjects the local proof context was the main visual cue in choosing the
next tactic. This result is in line with the proof as programming view. It is notable that
subjects 2 and 3 stated that past subgoals were never a cue and, in this regard, their
approach to proof discovery corresponds to the proof as programming view.
The dominant method of applying proof steps in six out of seven trials was the depth-
rst approach. This was not the exclusive mode of interaction as there is evidence that this
approach was combined with proof script renement to a greater extent than predicted.
5.3.2. evidence on granularity and visual cues
On average a proof step was composed of 1.2 tactics and there were 2.44 proof steps in
each context. Correspondingly, there were 2.92 tactics in each context (averages derived
from Table 3). These results clearly show that the granularity of the user interaction
with HOL is greater than the level of single tactics. Subjects made use of the command
line interface to enter proof steps composed of several tactics on a signicant number of
occasions.
The data in Table 4 provide evidence for the utility of continuous display of the current
goal and assumptions. There is much less evidence for the usefulness of the past subgoals
of the current proof tree as a cue. In some cases, the subjects who stated that past
subgoals were a cue were referring to the subgoal states reached by the failure of past
proof steps and these states do not remain on the proof tree once a backup command
has been given.
5.3.3. the logical level
The proof context is interpreted as reflecting the structure of the proof at the logical
level. Each context is explored by more than two interactions and involves expanding
almost three tactics on average. This is strong evidence for the idea that users organise
the proof attempt at a signicantly larger granularity than the tactic level. There is the
possibility that an interface could represent these contexts explicitly and we discuss this
further below.
5.3.4. decomposition by selection
While all subjects tackled the same problem, the solutions varied in approach as well
as in length and in the proportion of decomposition steps. The highest proportion of
decomposition steps was 66% and the lowest 33%, see Tables 1 and 2 (excluding subject
7 who did not complete the proof). Table 2 shows that no subject made more than
one error. This indicates that the HOL users who took part in this trial did not have
signicant problems in selecting tactics to eliminate logical connectives or to instantiate
variables.
There was evidence from informal discussions and from the think-aloud protocols that
subjects found the identication of assumptions and the specialisation of variables to
be dicult, or to require signicant thought. The results in Table 2 indicate that they
y Subjects were permitted to name any number of cues, hence the percentages for each subject do
not add up to 100.
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could solve such problems correctly. However, an aid to decomposition such as a selection
mechanism might decrease the time required to do so.
5.4. discussion
The dominant mode of interaction with HOL, which we observed, can be described
as proof as programming. It was observed that some HOL users have developed a style
of interaction which diers from that which is typically taught to new users and which
appears to be equally eective in terms of time spent on the proof. The results of the
study suggest that our original view of proof as programming placed insucient emphasis
on the proof script as an interaction object. The results show that users nd it useful
to switch between simple backwards proof and proof script renement as a means of
developing a proof. This possibility did not feature clearly in our original view of the
interaction.
There is some evidence for the potential utility of a proof by selection mechanism.
There is less evidence in favour of a proof tree representation of the proof state, at least
for problems of similar complexity to the example proof we studied.
The results concerning the logical level structure of proofs suggest a number of ways
that proof context could be incorporated into interface design. Designers might provide
displays of the current context, and hide all other contexts. Contexts could be labelled
with notes to document the proof or the proof may be displayed as a tree of contexts,
which would be a more manageable prospect than a tree of subgoal states. We consider
that representing the proof structure at the logical level to be an important means by
which users abstract from the detail of the concrete proof and reflect on proof structure.
Consequently, we believe that an interface should make salient those features which we
observed to be central in user planning and proof construction.
6. Conclusions
HCI-based studies typically need both to model the phenomena and to collect empir-
ical data. Approaches to interactive proof dier such that they cannot be characterised
by a single model; we need to specialise a rather general framework in order to capture
important distinctions. Specifying models of the activity is an important part of improv-
ing our understanding of this particular form of human{computer interaction. However,
we have a further objective: to formulate design principles and guidelines based on the
aforementioned theoretical and empirical results.
In this paper we have proposed a three layer model which accounts for interaction with
a theorem prover: at the concrete level of keystrokes, at the abstract interaction level of
tactic texts and proof states, and at the logical level where the explanation is in terms of
conjectures and legitimate proof steps. We have suggested that the relationship between
the abstract and logical levels should be examined more closely, and identied three
distinct views which determine the nature of the relationship and how it is represented:
proof as programming, proof by pointing, and structure editing. We used these views
to propose an analysis of both the standard, and other interfaces, to the HOL theorem
prover.
An empirical study of HOL users was carried out and the results were interpreted with
respect to what we argued was the dominant view of interaction, proof as programming.
We conclude that this view is indeed the dominant style of interaction with HOL. We
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therefore suggest that interfaces to HOL should make salient those features which are
supported by this view, though there may also be a role for interface features which
are derived from other views of proof. We currently have no evidence for or against the
mixing of views in a single interface and believe that this is a question which needs to
be addressed. On answering this question we shall be in a position to recommend how
views should be embodied in interface design and how, if at all, they can be combined.
In this way we shall arrive at design principles.
We note that the scope of the investigation did not include any substantial development
or formalisation of new mathematical theories. We concentrated on proof development
within the reasonably familiar theory of lists. Clearly, it is important to see how our
models scale up, and so interaction in the development of larger-scale proofs, including
substantial theory developments, will be the subject of future investigations.
Our experience in conducting this work conrms the value of an HCI-oriented inves-
tigation of theorem proving. Such an investigation oers a source of insights to those
interested in improving the quality of interaction with theorem provers, as well as en-
larging our understanding of the activity of computer-assisted reasoning. Careful analysis
of empirical studies such as the one reported here provide valuable information about
what users of theorem provers actually do. HCI research can oer important organising
concepts for thinking about interface design|for example the ideas about views and
levels of description explained above. Finally, HCI research can provide the designers of
theorem proving interfaces (who are seldom HCI experts themselves) with a specialised
vocabulary for discussing the merits of specic designs and features.
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